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The prospecT is sublime. off The coasT of The mainland are is-
lands—in facT, sweeping archipelagoes—inhabiTed by educa- 
tors and students. The residents have built massive modern class-
rooms, high- rises, clock towers, conference rooms, amphitheaters, 
auditoriums, and libraries among the evergreens, campuses with 
spacious lawns. To get to one of these islands, you can go directly 
from certain information kiosks or portals. Or, if you know the way 
and don’t run into any invisible Plexiglas walls extending far up into 
the sky, you can just levitate, tilt into the wind, and fly there, while 
the landscape scrolls along below you like a map (which it is).
I’m describing not a real- world landscape but a digital one, the 
3-D multiuser virtual environment Second Life, which was opened 
by Linden Lab in 2003, roughly a decade after the advent of the 
World Wide Web. In the past few years, some journalists, corpo-
rations, and academics have increasingly treated the proprietary 
platform Second Life as the end toward which the Web is evolving, 
sometimes in the belief that 3-D is inherently better than 2-D (or the 
“flat Web,” as some fans refer to most of the rest of the network, as 
if it were the medieval flat earth) and often under the mistaken im-
pression that this newest new thing is a self- contained and unitary 
virtual world set apart from the general chaos of the Web.1 Intellec-
tual, cultural, and financial capital is flowing into and out of Linden 
Lab’s “metaverse,” often because of an assumption that Second Life 
represents the “future of the Internet.” On April Fool’s Day 2008, 
the United States congressional Subcommittee on Telecommunica-
tions and the Internet held a hearing on the topic of online virtual 
worlds, focused almost exclusively on Second Life. Simulcast inside 
Second Life, the hearing took up questions such as the possibility 
that Islamic militants could use avatars inside the virtual world to 
recruit and plan terrorist attacks. The idea that this would be more 
likely or more effective in Second Life than on any number of exist-
ing “2-D” Web sites is a sign of the mystifying aura surrounding 
this platform.
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Cyberspace versus the Metaverse
Second Life has a prehistory. It was built 
through remediation of earlier technology 
platforms for interactive virtual spaces, from 
the text- based mazes of Adventure to the so-
cial spaces of MUDs ( multiuser dungeons) and 
MOOs (MUDs object- oriented). Like these 
earlier platforms, Second Life is often under-
stood in terms of the loaded concept of virtual 
reality, meaning total sensory immersion in a 
self- contained alternative world. In the popular 
imagination, virtual-reality environments of-
ten represent a disembodied second nature and 
raise fundamental questions about the nature 
of human subjectivity. These questions seemed 
especially urgent in the era from William Gib-
son’s Neuromancer (1984) to The Matrix (1999) 
and N. Katherine Hayles’s How We Became 
Posthuman (1999). As Hayles explains, during 
the first decade of the World Wide Web, much 
debate in the humanities arose in response to 
the notion that information was becoming de-
materialized, “losing its body.” When Second 
Life is described (as it often is) as another world 
where you can build anything you can imagine 
and be anything you desire, I hear echoes from 
the heroic era of cyberspace and virtual real-
ity.2 During the 1990s, Moore’s law (referring 
to exponential growth in computing processor 
speeds) was often erroneously extrapolated to 
suggest that an inexorable increase in realism 
and immersion was the ultimate end of the 
evolution of the Web’s interface. As a corol-
lary, human subjectivity was assumed to be 
uncoupling from bodily constraints, a process 
symbolized by one of the defining images of 
Second Life—the animated flying avatar.
Flying avatars are fun, as I’d be the first to 
admit. But the overall experience of Second Life 
during any given session is much less totally 
immersive, self- contained, and disembodied 
than the uninitiated might have been led to be-
lieve. For example, to levitate, you have to use 
a keystroke or click a button on the interface 
framing your specialized browser. Then, while 
hanging suspended above the ground, you use 
the arrow keys, as in many video games, to 
move in one of four directions—just as when 
walking. You often see buildings forming out 
of pixilated graphic “primitives” as you fly past 
too quickly. There is a cartoon quality to this 
world, which is graphically anything but re-
alistic. Sometimes you experience server lag, 
and your avatar hesitates to respond to key-
board commands. In any session, you may 
have to consult maps and signs to know which 
building is the one you are looking for. In fact, 
there are signs and labels and other forms of 
text everywhere. To communicate with other 
avatars, you mostly type on your keyboard as 
your avatar makes typing motions in the air, 
and then word bubbles appear above his or her 
head. Text hangs like a cloud of smoke in the 
air above a crowd of avatars. In other words, 
you necessarily remain at all times both in the 
world and out of it, controlling what happens 
by way of interface conventions. Although you 
become somewhat less conscious of the inter-
face with extended time in the simulated world, 
it remains a little like watching what’s going on 
in the reflection on your train window at the 
same time that you’re aware of the city going 
past beyond the window—a multilayered expe-
rience of divided attention, at the threshold of 
the virtual world and the physical world.
Neal Stephenson’s novel Snow Crash 
(1992) was the inspiration for Second Life, 
and the virtual world is often known by the 
name of his fictional network: the metaverse. 
Unlike William Gibson’s earlier invented 
network, cyberspace, which resembles the 
abstract architecture of a government and fi-
nancial database, Stephenson’s metaverse is a 
good deal like a MUD or an early video game. 
Gibson’s cyberspace is vast and lonely. Ste-
phenson’s metaverse is full of bars and private 
houses, motorcycles to ride and other avatars 
with whom to interact. Gibson’s lone hackers 
have to break into the network. Residents of 
Stephenson’s metaverse sometimes own prop-
erty there or, if they can’t afford it, log in from 
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cheap public accounts using graphically infe-
rior avatars. Denizens move fluidly in and out 
of the metaverse, opportunistically pursuing 
quests and engaging in fights both in and out 
of the virtual world, in a style clearly based on 
video games. Economically, cyberspace and 
the metaverse are images of capitalism. But 
Gibson’s is a vision of monolithic corporate 
control, whereas Stephenson’s is of a market-
place of jostling forces (complete with war-
lords, tribal enclaves, and rampant viruses). 
The tension between these different perspec-
tives on the social economy of Second Life is 
still playing itself out—for example, with in-
 world protests over the recent news that Lin-
den Lab was arranging special pricing of land 
to favor corporate “builds” (as constructed 
objects are called). But the key technological 
difference between these two fictional models 
is indicated by the prefix in metaverse. Just as 
metadata are data about data, the metaverse 
is a universe of networked activities attached 
to—and encoded in meaningful correspon-
dence with—the material universe of physical 
objects and social relations.
That this social world includes even com-
mercial and legal relations was made abun-
dantly clear during the CopyBot scandal of 
2006, when a cloning program was written by a 
group of programmers named libsecondlife, at 
first with the support of Linden Lab. Its source 
code was released and then retooled within 
Second Life, with the result that residents who 
had paid for objects or created their own ob-
jects to use or sell found them unprotected 
against rampant duplication. Peter Ludlow, a 
journalist who wrote for an in- world newspa-
per, saw the CopyBot affair as “a key moment 
in the evolution of Second Life” and reacted 
with a tabloid alarm expressing real anxiety:
The era of utopian self- expression insulated 
from the exigencies of the wider Web was 
clearly over. But how much sway the real 
world would have remained to be seen. The 
real world and the virtual world were col-
liding like never before, and it was anyone’s 
Fig. 1
The author’s 
avatar visiting an 
educational site in 
Second Life.
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guess whether the energy released in that col-
lision would be too destructive for the meta-
verse to handle. (Ludlow and Wallace 262)
Is Ludlow equating the “wider Web” with the 
“real world” in his crisis scenario? Or does his 
use of “wider” as a qualifier suggest that Sec-
ond Life might after all be a subset of the Web, 
over and against the real world? Perhaps he en-
visions worlds in three layers—virtual world, 
wider Web, and real world. The confusion is 
typical of a good deal of popular discussions 
of Second Life. The CopyBot incident was only 
a vivid reminder of the already- existing state 
of affairs. Early adopters’ feelings notwith-
standing, Second Life has always been deeply 
penetrated by the exigencies of the real world, 
including the Web. As Kari Kraus has recently 
shown, the CopyBot incident highlights the 
persistence of intellectual- property disputes 
inside Second Life, where objects can be more 
restricted than copyright laws allow, since cre-
ators can set permissions to prevent moving, 
modifying, copying, or transferring—the kind 
of restrictions on an owner’s rights that are 
“normally either unregulated or protected by 
law in real life” (2). As Kraus shows, Second Life 
residents who purchase a virtual copy of a book 
to read in- world, for example, might very well 
be less able “legally” to annotate or share that 
book than they would be if they had purchased 
a paper copy from their university bookstore.
Despite this sort of difference in its codes, 
both legal and programming, the publicity 
generated by the CopyBot affair, as well as the 
very existence of critical analysis like Kraus’s, 
demonstrates that Second Life cannot re-
ally remain separate from the wider world of 
intellectual- property laws and the debates sur-
rounding them. Second Life has never been a 
world apart. To begin with, it has always been 
part of the Web, which after all provides its 
infrastructure. The clearest reminder of this 
dependency is the system of Second Life URLs 
(slurl .com), which show up in Google searches 
as Web pages from which one can jump 
straight into particular locations in Second 
Life (clicking a link launches the Second Life 
client program). But the worldliness of Second 
Life is perhaps most evident in the exchange-
ability of in- world and real- world currencies. 
In Second Life and in almost all massively 
multiplayer online role-playing games, such 
as World of Warcraft, fungible goods and ser-
vices and currency (in Second Life, “Lindens”) 
can be purchased with dollars on eBay and 
can be exchanged across the border of the vir-
tual world and the real world (Castronova).
The Metaverse and the Social Text
Instead of being a world apart from mate-
rial reality, the metaverse of Second Life is 
best understood as intertwined with larger 
trends often referred to under the heading of 
“Web 2.0.” Reflecting a change in perspective 
among Internet developers and users, Web 2.0 
amounts to a greater stress on the importance 
of rich metadata (often using XML— extensible 
markup language) and of combinations of 
marked- up data objects and scripts such as 
AJAX (asynchronous JavaScript and XML). In 
general, the trend is toward a more modular, 
recombinatory approach to texts, images, and 
other objects available on the Web, as exempli-
fied by popular social-networking sites. Web 
2.0 is a flexible platform on which to configure 
variously designed (and often user- created or 
user- enriched) services. Google Maps, Face-
book, Flickr, YouTube, Wikipedia, and podcasts 
are familiar examples. Wherever possible, 
sites enlist users in tagging objects, relying 
on  bottom- up “folksonomy” versus top- down 
taxonomy, on the benefits of “collective intel-
ligence” that have been discussed by the media 
theorist Henry Jenkins, for example (27). Such 
schemes recognize that every use of an object 
on the network represents a node in the history 
of the object, and the object itself is the totality 
of its history of uses. The goal is to build on 
that history to enable ongoing, multiple, dy-
namic recombinations. It’s a way of  leveraging 
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what computers do so well—recording and 
tracking complex interactions in great detail—
making the computer a partner in the collec-
tive acts of marking, sharing, combining, and 
editing. Human agency and machine intelli-
gence are thereby interrelated by design.
In her recent book on electronic literature, 
N. Katherine Hayles outlines a general trend 
toward binding human beings and computers 
together in recursive, “dynamic heterarchies 
characterized by intermediating dynamics” and 
sees this relation as fostered by what some have 
called “augmented reality”: the fact that com-
puters are increasingly “moving out of the box 
into the environment though ubiquitous com-
puting, embedded sensors and actuators, mo-
bile technologies, smart nanodevices embedded 
in a wide variety of surfactants and surfaces, 
real- time sensors and data flows” (Electronic 
Literature 47–48). For Hayles this scenario is a 
harbinger of “a new kind of subjectivity char-
acterized by distributed cognition, networked 
agency that includes human and non- human 
actors, and fluid boundaries dispersed over ac-
tual and virtual locations . . .” (37). “[P]eople and 
machines are both embodied, and the specifica-
tions of their embodiments can best be under-
stood in the recursive dynamics whereby they 
coevolve with one another” (129). In response to 
the same trend toward augmented reality, Bruce 
Sterling projects a coming “Internet of things,” 
based on RFID (radio-frequency identification) 
tags and metadata attached to physical objects, 
connected by WiFi in networks. This new kind 
of network will rely on conceiving of objects as 
existing in relation to their users over time. In 
this future Internet of things, Sterling suggests, 
each metatagged object (marked with metadata 
but also physically tagged with an RFID chip, 
say) would be encoded in ways that reveal its ex-
istence as a node in a social network, the nexus 
of various sets of “technosocial interactions 
that unite people and objects” (22). In fact, as 
Sterling argues, when “[p]roperly understood, a 
thing is not merely a material object, but a fro-
zen technosocial relationship” (68).
This should sound familiar to historically 
minded scholars, and particularly to textual 
scholars. Textual theorists such as D. F. Mc-
Ken zie and Jerome McGann have argued 
that the texts we study are best conceived of 
as nodes of social relations. Texts are the cu-
mulative histories of their own receptions. 
The social- text theory of textual transmission, 
therefore, focuses not on static and isolated 
verbal objects but on dynamic discourse fields 
composed of interacting verbal, graphic, biblio-
graphic, cultural, ideological, and social forces. 
A text, according to this theory, is a switch or 
node in the network of these forces, the place 
where meanings are dynamically generated. In 
this sense, McKenzie called for a sociological 
understanding of textuality and for a broader 
definition of the social text—as any recorded 
form of “verbal, visual, oral, numeric data, 
in the form of maps, prints, and music, of ar-
chives of recorded sound, of films, videos, and 
any computer- stored information” (13). Note 
that he imagines the social text in the form of 
data and that he envisions it as mapped onto 
the networked objects of the wider physical 
world. He famously asked “if there is any sense 
in which the land—not even a representation 
of it on a map, but the land itself—might be a 
text” (39). (This question had serious political 
implications, for example, when it came to the 
textuality of the physical landscape as it was 
mapped and interpreted by competing parties 
to a treaty in New Zealand.) The object of bib-
liography and textual studies was for McKen-
zie a field of data- rich events unfolding in the 
world: “physical forms, textual versions, tech-
nical transmission, institutional control, their 
perceived meanings, and social effects” (13).
McGann has argued that McKenzie “would 
have found that his ‘social text’ approach to 
scholarly work was greatly and practically ad-
vanced by the resources of digital technology” 
(“Database” 1592). And McGann has for over a 
decade extended his own long- term investiga-
tions of the social text into the realm of digital 
media, using as a test bed his Rossetti Archive, 
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for example (“From Text” ). He advocates a 
“quantum poetics” in which texts are seen 
not as “discrete phenomena” but as non- self-
 identical events that include the position and 
engagement of the scholar (Radiant Textuality 
228–31). We will achieve this perspective, he 
predicts, by “exposing the fault- lines of inter-
pretational methods that implicitly or explic-
itly treat any part of the study process as fixed 
or self- identical,” but also by developing new 
interpretive practices and tools, including tools 
derived from games: “Models for these kinds 
of tools descend to us through our culture in 
games and role- playing environments” (164).
Games of Meaning
A number of recent scholars have begun to ex-
plore the relation of textual studies and video 
games. Matthew Kirschenbaum brilliantly 
applies a method he calls textual forensics to 
new- media objects of various kinds, including 
gamelike interactive fictions such as Mystery 
House. In the first book in the new series they 
are editing at MIT Press, Platform Studies, 
Nick Montfort and Ian Bogost look at the ma-
terial conditions for the reception of games for 
the classic Atari VCS (Video Computer System) 
of the 1980s. My own recent book (2008) ar-
gues for the relevance of a social- text approach 
to understanding the meanings of video games 
as collectively constructed by their designers, 
publishers, marketers, players, and fans. From 
a different perspective, McGann and Johanna 
Drucker’s Ivanhoe project is a practical experi-
ment developed to use dynamic digital simula-
tions in a gamelike environment to explore the 
ongoing reception histories of literary works 
(see Rockwell). Ivanhoe provides dynamic visu-
alizations on a pie chart of the critical “moves” 
any group of players make in collectively inter-
preting or rewriting a selected literary text (an 
early version was played with Walter Scott’s 
Ivanhoe). It’s also a kind of role- playing game 
(RPG). Players must play in character, whether 
as a character chosen from the text in ques-
tion, a critic, a book dealer, a historical figure, 
or someone purely imaginary. The goal is to 
establish the relation of the character to the 
text and to its multiple versions and competing 
interpretations. The graphics represent moves 
of multiple players and the collective effect of 
their moves on the discourse field as a whole.
As conceptually innovative as Ivanhoe is 
in the humanities, this form of modeling—
mapping the actual and possible moves of 
avatar characters in relation to one another, 
in a shared digital space that visualizes the 
results of moves as a set of feedback loops—
is what video games already do, at a more 
sophisticated level, in terms of their compu-
tational power and the power of their visual-
izations. World of Warcraft, for example, like 
Second Life, is run across a grid of servers, 
each hosting at any given time a small subset 
of the game’s massive community and keep-
ing records of players’ actions in the game. Or 
consider Spore, the “massively single- player” 
evolution and space- exploration game de-
signed by Will Wright, creator of The Sims. 
Spore exists in a proliferation of parallel 
universes, copies of which are stored on the 
computers of individual players, who may 
populate and shape planets and upload the 
results to a grid of Spore servers for down-
loading by all. Exploiting a social- networking 
model, the game relies on distributed content 
creation by players and asynchronous content 
sharing, a kind of time- shifted social interac-
tion that the developers call the “pollination 
process” (Shaw; see Jones 150–73). As I play 
Spore, I can download and encounter other 
players’ creatures, cities, and planets and in-
teract with them inside my copy of the game, 
destroying them, cooperating with them, and 
so on, without altering the other players’ own 
copies of their creatures, objects, and worlds. 
And in turn I can pollinate the Spore universe 
with my own creations. The Spore servers 
supply constantly updated “metaverse” sta-
tistics. In this case, the term refers to game 
metadata telling me, for example, that my 
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planet in a particular galaxy has been blown 
up by another player (or many other play-
ers), and giving particulars of the encounter. 
But this destruction is visited only on a copy 
of my planet; the planet will still be there in 
my game the next time I play. Wright has said 
that this model offers the benefits of playing 
online—“all the people building the world col-
lectively together”—but without the drawback 
that “the fourteen- year- old can kill you or that 
you’ve invested all this time in your planet 
and somebody comes along and blows it up” 
(as happens frequently in World of Warcraft).
Even these mainstream video games rep-
resent sophisticated ideas of what it means 
to enable on a digital platform the dynamic, 
networked, collaborative construction of the 
social text, broadly conceived. Like McKen-
zie’s readings of the textual, marked nature 
of an Australian geographic landscape or 
of maps in general, these games treat their 
“maps” (their game environments) as texts, 
which is to say not as narratives in the limited 
sense but as sites for collective acts of meaning 
making (in the form of gameplay), including 
self- conscious modeling and visualization of 
those acts. At its best, Second Life is poten-
tially gamelike in this sense, as a simulated 
landscape of textualizable events. Too few 
of the educational (and corporate) residents, 
however, understand or exploit this strength, 
in part because they are under the sway of an 
ideology of virtual reality as a transcendent 
and otherworldly experience. Gamers know 
better. Consider the hybrid, transmedia form 
of the alternate-reality game (ARG), in which 
ad hoc teams of players engage in elaborate 
acts of meaning making in the real world, 
using Web sites, payphones, cellphones, and 
even mailed physical objects as tokens and 
sources of information. The game world in 
this case overlaps with the (marked- up) real 
world, physical spaces and objects encoded 
with their geographic locations and tagged in 
various ways to enable dynamic social inter-
actions. A larger textual narrative is thereby 
collectively constructed from clues hidden in 
plain sight. ARGs have been used as viral mar-
keting campaigns for films and for Microsoft’s 
video game Halo 2 (Jones 76–82). The creator 
of “I Love Bees,” the ARG for Halo 2, later or-
ganized a game with global aspirations (and 
global funding), tied to the 2008 Olympics 
and sponsored in part—to the consternation 
of some of her fans—by Mac Donald’s (Mc-
Gonigal). Instead of sustaining the illusion of a 
virtual world apart, an island of immateriality, 
the digital network in an ARG is always only 
one part of a larger, impure, social network, 
and the goal is a marked text dynamically 
mapped onto and embodied in the world.
The Network Is Everting
In closing, I want to return to the invention 
of cyberspace. William Gibson has said that 
he was inspired by video games—not by play-
ing them, but by watching others play them. 
The idea of cyberspace came to him while he 
observed “the body- language” of kids playing 
early arcade games in the 1980s, leaning into 
their painted fiberboard and glass consoles 
pinball- style, pushing the buttons, and—so 
Gibson assumed—longing to “reach right 
through the screen and get with what they 
were playing with,” to merge with the game, 
to inhabit the virtual space behind the glass 
(No Maps). His fiction projected a dark future 
in which computer networks would make 
such transcendence infinitely easier to achieve 
and immersive, an imagined experience that 
retained something of the opacity of Gibson’s 
vicarious, voyeuristic arcade experience.
The idea of arcade players as disembodied 
and immersed in the virtual space of the game 
“behind the screen,” while perhaps loosely 
based in a feeling many gamers have experi-
enced at times of being temporarily absorbed 
in the game, is at best a misleading partial 
truth. Video gameplay (and this was especially 
true in an arcade of the 1980s) is necessarily 
a hybrid experience, bodily as well as mental. 
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And many video games in our own time play 
on this hybridity by foregrounding the player’s 
body movements: dancing on electronic pads, 
manipulating a plastic guitar, pulling physical 
triggers, performing the motions of skiing or 
driving or kung- fu fighting. Nintendo’s popu-
lar Wii platform is all about highlighting the 
somatic interface. Players swing and poke and 
swipe the Wiimote controller, usually standing 
in front of the screen. But even using the con-
ventional joystick- and- button controls requires 
a physical as well as mental engagement, and 
it’s common to see players at home or in ar-
cades twisting and leaning into their consoles 
or control pads, dancing, or playing drum or 
guitar controllers. Gibson’s muses, those 1980s 
arcade gamers, were more likely to have been 
trying to master and manipulate the physical 
fiberboard, glass, and plastic consoles of their 
games than seeking an out- of- body transcen-
dence in cyberspace. He began with observa-
tions of the gamers’ body language, and only 
afterward did he interpret the grabbing and 
leaning and bumping as signs of an urge to 
escape to the imaginary disembodied “space 
behind the glass.” Video gameplay in popular 
accounts (Gibson’s is only a famous early one) 
is often falsely depicted as a disembodied im-
mersion in virtual reality, when the real thing 
usually demands mixed attention, cool in its 
detachment and aware of the game and its al-
ways at least partly haptic or somatic interface.
In what looks like a return of repressed 
materiality, Gibson suggests in his latest novel, 
Spook Country (2007), set in the present mo-
ment, that “cyberspace” is now “everting”—
being “turned inside out” and mapping itself 
onto the external material world. The totality 
of networks, in this view, forms the hybrid re-
ality of a grid imposed on the natural world 
by GPS satellite data, for example, linked up 
through RFID tags and WiFi. Instead of a 
sublime cyberspace apart from the world, this 
everted network has the constructed, plastic 
feel of the material world as artists experience 
it, as a possibility space tagged with metadata. 
The primary artistic practice depicted in the 
novel is locative art, which uses “spatially 
tagged hypermedia” to create “annotated 
environments” by overlaying crafted images 
and data onto geographic locations. The plot 
of Spook Country turns on a major political 
demonstration (or prank) that looks like an 
act of terror but turns out to be more like a 
work of performance art. An ad hoc group of 
interested parties with various kinds of ex-
pertise, mental as well as physical, including 
“geohacking” and martial arts, come together 
and cooperate to “mark [up]” a shipping con-
tainer full of cash by shooting irradiating cap-
sules into it at long range. That goal is blocked 
by many obstacles, including homeland-
 security laws, and requires the use of special 
tools and skills. In fact, the more you think 
of it, the more the “prank” at the heart of the 
novel appears to be an alternate-reality game. 
Or a demonstration of Sterling’s Internet of 
things. Or an example of the dynamism of 
any networked social text. At one point, the 
protagonist imagines a powerful character 
watching the action through satellite feeds 
from surveillance cameras on a large screen in 
his office—“[t]he world as video game” (344).
This formulation carries plenty of sinister 
implications. Cyberpunk fiction and film codi-
fied the mood into a tech- noir aesthetic, and, 
after Jean Baudrillard’s remarks on the Persian 
Gulf War, for example, we now, in an era of total 
security, conventionally understand any com-
parison of reality to video games as an ominous 
metaphor for techno- hegemony, the production 
of the culture industry, what the game theo-
rist McKenzie Wark refers to as the “military-
 entertainment complex.” For Wark, the “real 
world appears as a video arcadia divided into 
many and varied games” (005). His term for the 
logic linking the game world and the real world 
is “allegorithm” (30)—an allegorical correspon-
dence controlled by rule- driven processes, or 
algorithms. Ironically, Gibson offers a slightly 
more hopeful perspective on technology, 
power, and the  possibilities of resistance, drawn 
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 perhaps from his interest in street- level uses of 
technology, hackers’ and artists’ and fans’ ap-
propriations. In his recent work, he also sees the 
world as a game world, but in the sense that it is 
a grid on which meanings, though constrained, 
can be socially constructed, and he therefore 
recognizes possibilities for creative expres-
sion and community implied in the otherwise 
dark prospects opened by the everted network. 
A game space is not an infinite virtual reality, 
never an island of disembodied consciousness, 
but is instead a possibility space in multiple di-
mensions, one whose objects are deliberately 
marked up or metatagged by human intelli-
gence, which is certainly constrained but is also 
capable of recombinatory acts of meaning mak-
ing. In that sense, video games offer humanists 
serious models for potential networked events 
of their own—embodied, intermediated, and 
out in the world.
Notes
1. There are of course exceptions, including educators 
who understand that “no virtual world is an island” and 
connect Second Life to the “wider Web” (e.g., Joseph 11).
2. This metaphysical, sublime view of virtual reality is 
historically connected to William Gibson’s invention of 
cyberspace in the 1980s, as Matthew Kirschenbaum sug-
gests in a discussion of interface essentialism in media 
studies (34–35) and as I develop below.
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